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ABSTRACT 
The President of the United States has requested increased security at the 
southern border, mainly by investing in and building a border wall. Some argue that this 
will cost too much money, and some argue that it simply will not be effective. 
Conversely, others would argue that it is a necessary tool within the United States’ border 
security policy. This thesis examines a potential border wall’s effectiveness by analyzing 
illegal immigration apprehensions and drug seizures. Furthermore, this thesis uses the 
southern border’s existing border fencing as an example of how border infrastructure 
affects the flow of illegal immigrants and drugs. 
In addition to the land border, this thesis hypothesized that, based on historic 
border security data, an increase in land border security will result in an increase in illegal 
immigration and drug smuggling through maritime routes. So, illegal immigration and 
drug smuggling data from before and after large amounts of border fence mileage were 
constructed was compared from land and maritime perspectives. 
This research found that a border wall can be effective at redirecting the flow of 
people and drugs, but ineffective at the greater goal of stopping it. Also, this thesis 
discovered changes in maritime border security data that suggest that as security is 
increased on the land border with border barriers, the maritime domain will experience 
significantly more drug smuggling and illegal immigration. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The President of the United States is requesting increased security at the southern 
border. To do this, a border wall has been chosen as the ideal solution. The notion of having 
a border wall caused a divisive split within the government and population, especially since 
the topic had become a major issue in the presidential election campaign. Because of this, 
two schools of thought emerged: supporters and opposers of the border wall. But the United 
States has adopted this policy before and already has hundreds of miles of border barriers 
along the southern border. This raises the question of whether or not the border wall we 
already have is working. If it is effective, then logically adding more wall would be a 
benefit. If it is not effective, then we know a new border wall is not the solution. 
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not so simple. 
With scholars and government officials on both sides of the argument, it is hard to 
determine what the right answer is. What can be done is to examine the current border wall 
and its effects and extrapolate those finding to a new and longer border wall that the 
president is calling for. In addition, a sometimes-forgotten aspect of the border security 
enterprise is the coastlines. If the southern border is becoming more secure from a border 
wall, will that affect the nearby waterways? Or will the increased land security eventually 
just deter people from attempting to cross? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the construction of a border wall on the United States’ southern border 
underway,1 evaluating its effectiveness has significant political, financial, and national 
security implications. Supporters argue that a border wall will help protect the United 
States from terrorism, illegal immigration, and illegal trafficking, but no matter how 
effective it is on land, the border wall is not designed to protect against maritime threats. 
                                                 
1 Although a border wall along the entire United States-Mexico border has not been approved, an 
additional 102 miles of a border wall and planning for more was ordered by President Trump and approved 
by Congress in the FY18 budget. 
2 
This thesis asks first, can a southern United States border wall achieve the objectives it is 
built to accomplish on land? And second, because the border wall is only protecting the 
southern land border and there are large coastlines to the East and West of the land border, 
how will the increased land protection from the border wall affect maritime border 
security? 
C. BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the United States’ national security 
posture increased. The U.S. government established the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This act placed 22 different 
government agencies under the control of the DHS.2 Before 1940, immigration was 
managed under the Department of Labor, and as a result it was viewed as a enployment 
problem. Then immigration moved under the control of the Department of Justice. There 
it was managed as a legal issue. Now, under the DHS, it is a security and terrorism issue.3 
The change in how border security and immigration has been viewed is clear. As Iowa 
Senator Chuck Grassley said, “9/11 just awoke everybody to the fact that it was awfully 
easy to get into the United States.”4 
The first fencing along the U.S.-Mexican border was authorized in 1990 and 
installed near San Diego, California.5 Next, Congress overwhelmingly approved upgrades 
and additional fencing by passing the Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996.6 This authorization was later amended by the Secure Fence 
Act of 2006, which as of May 2015 resulted in the DHS installing “353 miles of primary 
pedestrian fencing, 300 miles of vehicle fencing (total of 653 miles), 36 miles of secondary 
                                                 
2 “History,” Department of Homeland Security, June 27, 2012, https://www.dhs.gov/history. 
3 Mallie Jane Kim, “After 9/11, Immigration Became About Homeland Security,” US News & World 




5 Carla Argueta, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, CRS Report No. 
R42138 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 14.  
6 Argueta, 14. 
3 
fencing behind the primary fencing, and 14 miles of tertiary pedestrian fencing behind the 
secondary fence.”7 The annual cost of constructing these barriers increased from $25 
million to $1.5 billion over the ten-year period from 1996 to 2006.8 Then in 2018, President 
Trump signed the fiscal year 2018 Budget, which authorized nearly $1.6 billion for 
designing and construction of a more robust 102-mile long border wall.9 As of March 2018, 
construction was planning to start in various areas.10 Ronald Vitiello, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection’s acting deputy commissioner, announced construction projects are 
scheduled to begin in “El Centro, San Diego, Santa Teresa, and the Rio Grande Valley.”11 
This history shows that as the United States’ concern over terrorism and porous borders 
increased in the post-9/11 era, so did the money appropriated to secure the border.  
With the cost of border security increasing and plans for new border fencing along 
portions of the U.S.-Mexico border proceeding, determining the effectiveness of the wall 
becomes even more critical. The possibility of a border wall that is effective can change 
the environment of illegal activity. With immigration and drug smuggling routes cut off or 
reduced on land by the border wall, a different path through the sea may be chosen as the 
path of least resistance. This route may offer a greater chance of success due to the vast 
expanse of open ocean and coastlines, which go mostly unmonitored. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
This literature review includes various types of congressional testimonies, 
government documents, and other scholarly work. The resources are divided into three 
sections. The first section reviews the arguments of supporters of the United States’ border 
                                                 
7 Argueta, 15. 
8 Argueta, 15–16. 
9 “DHS FY18 BIB Final,” accessed May 31, 2018, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20FY18%20BIB%20Final.pdf, 28. 
10 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Border Wall Construction Underway | U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection,” accessed August 29, 2018, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/spotlights/border-wall-
construction-underway. 
11 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
4 
wall. The second section reviews arguments from opponents of the border wall, who either 
view it as ineffective or see border walls as not worth the cost. The third section reviews 
expert opinion of the effectiveness of the United States’ maritime border security. 
2. Supporters of the U.S. Border Wall 
The border wall has had the support from former Secretaries of Homeland Security. 
In April 2017, then Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly reported to Congress that 
strategic building of more border barriers is likely because “physical barriers work.”12 
Also, former Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke proclaimed that 
“building a wall along our Southern border will save countless innocent lives.”13 She 
continued to defend the border wall by adding, “Border Patrol agents have seen firsthand 
the success of a border wall in Yuma, Ariz.—which serves as a prime example of how 
investments in personnel, technology, and a border wall can turn the tide against a flood of 
illegal immigration and secure our homeland.”14 She supported this claim by presenting 
data from law enforcement. Secretary Duke states that “under lax enforcement standards, 
apprehensions in FY2016 were roughly a 10th of what they were in FY 2005…. crime has 
significantly decreased in the Yuma area, and smugglers now look for other less difficult 
areas of the border to cross—often areas without fencing.”15  
Border wall supporters look to other countries as an example to determine whether 
a border wall would be effective. President Trump has repeatedly pointed to Israel to show 
that border walls work.16 Also, Senator Ron Johnson agreed by claiming, according to one 
                                                 
12 Tal Kopan, “Kelly: No Border Wall ‘from Sea to Shining Sea,’” CNN, April 5, 2017, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/05/politics/kelly-testimony-senate-homeland-border-security-
wall/index.html 
13 Elaine Duke, “United States: Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke USA Today Editorial: Border 





16 Miriam Valverde, “GOP Senator Says Israel Border Fence Cut Illegal Immigration,” @politifact, 
accessed June 13, 2018, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/feb/13/ron-
johnson/border-fence-israel-cut-illegal-immigration-99-per/. 
5 
report, “that a border fence in Israel has drastically cut illegal immigration along its 
southern border.”17 Senator Johnson added that Israel reduced illegal immigration along 
Israel’s southern border by 99 percent, from about 18,000 immigrants to 18.18 Harvard 
International Review’s Esteban Flores examined Spain’s border wall on the Spain and 
Morocco border. He states that in 2014, “2,100 immigrants successfully crossed from 
Morocco into Spain.”19 Since building a seven-mile-long steel wall separating Morocco, 
Spain reduced illegal immigration to 100 immigrants throughout 2015.20  
Other supporters point out that without border barriers, access to the border is open 
to anyone who wishes to cross. Avdan and Gelpi add that the “anxiety over clandestine and 
unauthorized territorial access has magnified the primacy of border control in world 
politics.”21 They go on to state that transnational threats to states can encompass a wide 
variety of types of people, “from the relatively innocuous—such as refugees and illegal 
migrants—to the more pernicious—such as organized crime, militants, and terrorists.”22 
Supporters of the wall argue that border fences can reduce the flow of terrorists across 
borders. Moreover, Nazli Avdan and Christopher Gelpi claim “that fences reduce the 
annual relative risk of a terrorist attack by at least 67 percent,”23 and therefore make an 
excellent tool for national security decision-makers.  
Border fences act as symbols of safety and security for the nation that is building 
them. The fear of terrorism, which is inherently psychological, shaped the public and 
policymaker’s view of border security. Avdan and Gelpi add that “a scared public is also 
                                                 
17 Valverde. 
18 Valverde. 
19 Esteban Flores, “Rio Grande: Walls of Separation: An Analysis of Three ‘Successful’ Border 
Walls,” Harvard International Review 38, no. 3 (2017) 10–12, https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1937371999?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
20 Flores. 
21 Nazli Avdan and Christopher F. Gelpi, “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers 
and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2016): 
sqw042, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw042, 14–27. 
22 Avdan and Gelpi, 14–27. 
23 Avdan and Gelpi, 14-27. 
6 
more likely to accept, and even champion, border closure.”24 As a result, they found that 
walls aid in easing the anxiety associated with terrorism.25 Therefore, increased border 
security through physical barriers garners support from the public. 
The United States has seen a change at the border following the construction of 
fencing in the San Diego area. According to the Congressional Research Service, 
installation of fencing in the 1990s showed successful results.26 In the San Diego sector, 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorized 
fencing with three layers in some areas. This resulted in law enforcement apprehensions to 
drop from “480,000 in FY1996 to 100,000 in FY2002,”27 and even more success from the 
three-tier fenced areas resulting in a drop of apprehensions from “321,560 FY1993 to 
19,035 in FY2004.”28 Looking at the entire southwest border, the CBP reports this as 
quantitative evidence that border fencing has a positive effect in reducing illegal border 
crossings.29 
3. Opposers of the U.S. Border Wall 
Opponents of the border wall make several different arguments. Some critics see 
violence as an outcome or cost of the border wall. Throughout the early 2000s, the Mexican 
drug war and drug trafficking to the United States from Mexico were intensifying.30 From 
2008 to 2011, homicides in Mexico but near the border and linked to drug cartels rose from 
around 500 to over 2000 deaths.31 Apart from preventing illegal immigration, preventing 
drug trafficking that can lead to such violence is a goal of the border barrier created by the 
                                                 
24 Avdan and Gelpi, 14–27. 
25 Avdan and Gelpi, 14–27. 
26 Blas Nunez-Neto and Michael J Garcia, Border Security: The San Diego Fence, CRS Report No. 
RS22026 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a469083.pdf, 4. 
27 Nunez-Neto and Garcia, 4. 
28 Nunez-Neto and Garcia, 4. 
29 Nunez-Neto and Garcia, 4. 
30 Benjamin Laughlin, “Border Fences and the Mexican Drug War,” (unpublished working paper, last 
modified March 2019), http://www.benjamin-laughlin.com/border_wall.pdf, 3. 
31 Laughlin, 3. 
7 
Secure Fence Act of 2006. Benjamin Laughlin, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of 
Pennsylvania, argues that the rise in violence was linked to the border fence and drug 
trafficking. By building a border fence, the United States essentially reduced the options 
for illegal drugs to cross the border. Laughlin asserts that “constructing a border wall 
changes the relative value of territory near the border for drug cartels, which upsets the 
equilibrium of territorial control.”32 The cost of smuggling is increased by reducing the 
available drug routes into the United States.33 He goes on to state that “areas near the new 
fence become less valuable to cartels and other areas with alternative smuggling routes 
become relatively more valuable. This shock to the value of territory controlled by drug 
cartels may cause cartels to fight over merely more valuable territory.”34 The violence 
caused by the drug war can expand into the United States near the border. 
Besides the secondary cost of violence, opponents of the border wall point out the 
direct financial cost of the wall. The CBP appreciated the $1.6 billion investment into the 
planning, design, and construction of the border wall, but their acting Deputy 
Commissioner viewed it as just a down payment.35 With no agreed upon price of the entire 
wall, supporters and opponents are left to estimate. The Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs is responsible for the oversight of the DHS and its 
border wall plans. The Democratic staff of the committee has investigated the estimated 
cost of the border wall, and it issued a report that raises several concerns. First, “there is no 
reliable estimate of the cost of construction of the full border wall, but extrapolated 
estimates place the construction cost of the wall and associated technology and 
infrastructure at nearly $70 billion.”36 This estimated cost does not include the cost of land 
purchase and maintenance. The report asserts that there is no estimate of how much it will 
cost for the government to buy the land from private owners but refers to the past as an 
                                                 
32 Laughlin, 4. 
33 Laughlin, 4. 
34 Laughlin, 5. 
35 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Border Wall Construction Underway.” 




example.37 It cost the government $78 million to purchase the land for the fencing that was 
installed under the Secure Fence Act.38 Also, the maintenance associated with the wall in 
the long term is estimated at $150 million per year.39  
Non-supporters of the wall see this as too high of a cost for the American people to 
bear. Over the last two years, price estimates have varied with initial estimates from 
President Trump at $10 billion, a leaked report from the DHS estimating the cost at $21.6 
billion, and a Senate committee estimation at $70 billion.40 Some political leaders wonder 
what the United States could purchase with that money instead of a border wall. The Navy’s 
newest, most expensive, and highly advanced aircraft carrier has cost $12.9 billion.41 U.S. 
Representative Scott Peters announced this would put the cost of the border wall equal to 
over one and a half Ford-Class aircraft carriers.42 
Opponents of the border wall also argue that regardless of the statistics that the CBP 
reports about the effectiveness of border fences, they are not viewing the problem with a 
big enough scope. Apprehensions near the current fence lines may have dropped following 
the construction, but critics question whether that accurately indicates progress in 
combating the immigration problem. Illegal aliens or undocumented workers may have 
never crossed the southern border illegally, but they overstay their visiting visa and thus 
are not counted when the focus is solely on border apprehensions. Robert Warren and 
Donald Kerwin reveal that about two-thirds of the undocumented population arrived on a 
visiting visa and overstayed the allotted time associated with their visa.43 They add, in fact, 
                                                 
37 “Southern Border Wall—HSGAC Minority Report, 1.” 
38 “Southern Border Wall—HSGAC Minority Report, 1.” 
39 “Southern Border Wall—HSGAC Minority Report, 1.” 
40 Chris Nichols, “Trump’s Border Wall Would Cost Same as 1.5 Aircraft Carriers,” @politifact, 
accessed May 31, 2018, http://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2017/apr/28/scott-peters/would-
trumps-border-wall-cost-same-one-and-half-us/. 
41 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues 
for Congress, CRS Report No. RS20643 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017) 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20643, 88. 
42 Nichols, “Trump’s Border Wall Would Cost Same as 1.5 Aircraft Carriers,” 
43 Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, “The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa 
Overstays Have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million,” Journal on Migration 
and Human Security 5, no. 1 (2017): 124–36. 
9 
“overstays have exceeded EWIs [immigrants who crossed the border illegally] every year 
since 2007.”44  
Border wall opponents point out that border walls have apparent vulnerabilities. As 
argued by Scott Savitz from the RAND Corporation, “In general, fences and walls do not 
prevent people from crossing boundaries; they merely slow them down.”45 He adds that 
the terrain along the border, like rivers and deserts, already creates a natural and difficult 
barrier to cross and a wall would only add a minor additional obstacle.46 Savitz claims that 
underground tunnels will no doubt undermine a border wall.47 His evidence for this is 
particularly strong, because as he explains, “it is already happening.”48 Law enforcement 
has discovered numerous tunnels connecting houses and warehouses in Mexico to other 
buildings in the United States. Cartels are evolving to the tactics used by the CBP and 
creating sophisticated tunnel systems including the use of lighting, ventilation, and 
railways.49  
Border walls are proven to be vulnerable underground, but new technology breeds 
new vulnerabilities for border walls. The Washington Times reported the U.S. Border 
Patrol arrested a man on the receiving end of a drone delivery from Mexico that flew over 
fence lines in San Diego.50 The drone was carrying 13 pounds of methamphetamine worth 
around $46,000 if sold on the streets.51 This is a growing concern. According to the 
Washington Times, “Border Patrol agents are increasingly worried about the threat from 
                                                 
44 Warren and Kerwin, 124–136. 





49 Jean Guerrero, “US-Mexico Drug Tunnels Evolving Amid Increased Border Security,” KPBS Public 
Media, accessed June 11, 2018, http://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/jun/21/us-mexico-drug-tunnels-change-
amid-increased-borde/. 
50 Stephen Dinan, “Drones Become Latest Tool Drug Cartels Use to Smuggle Drugs into U.S.,” The 





drug-cartel-flown drones after agents spotted 13 drones suspected of carrying drugs across 
one section of the U.S.-Mexico border in just one four-day period in November.”52 
Critics of the border wall add to their argument that, in respect to drug trafficking, 
transnational criminal organizations (TCO) have innovated their way underneath and over 
the border fence, but most of the drugs are smuggled through ports of entry. The Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) recognizes that Mexican TCOs have the greatest impact on 
illegal drugs entering the United States.53 In the 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, 
the DEA states that “Mexican TCOs transport the majority of illicit drugs into the United 
States across the Southwest border using a wide array of smuggling techniques. The most 
common method employed by these TCOs involves transporting illicit drugs through U.S. 
ports of entry in passenger vehicles with concealed compartments or commingled with 
legitimate goods on tractor trailers.”54 Also, Mexican TCOs transport drugs to the United 
States hidden in commercial cargo trains and passenger buses. Colombian TCOs use a 
different strategy. Using Puerto Rico as a staging area, they undertake a “variety of 
maritime and aerial means to include speedboats, fishing vessels, private aircraft, 
semisubmersibles, and commercial air and sea cargo”55 to transport illegal drugs to the 
United States. 
Opponents of the border wall question why the United States would spend so much 
money on a wall if most of the drugs are transported through ports of entry. Border wall 
opponents conclude that all transnational criminal organizations share a common strategy. 
Whether it is underground, through the air, in the water, or in a vehicle, all these strategies 
avoid or overcome a border wall.  
                                                 
52 Stephen Dinan, “13 Drones in Four Days: How Drug Smugglers Are Using Technology to Beat 
Border Patrol,” The Washington Times, accessed June 11, 2018, 
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53 Drug Enforcement Agency, “2017 National Drug Threat Assessment,” October 2017, 
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54 Drug Enforcement Agency, 6. 
55 Drug Enforcement Agency, 9. 
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4. Maritime Border Security 
Compared to the length of the United States’ land border, at 1933 miles, its 
maritime border is much larger, at 12,479 miles long.56 Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, reported at a 
Senate hearing about securing the United States’ maritime borders:  
Across these coastlines, migrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and 
Haiti seek to illegally enter the U.S., often forced into overcrowded boats 
with unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Transnational criminal organizations 
also transport drugs—marijuana on the west coast and cocaine on the east 
coast—into the U.S. via the maritime border.57 
In addition to illegal immigration and drug trafficking threats, Senator Johnson adds that 
terrorism is still a threat to the United States’ maritime borders.58 Terrorists can enter the 
country by transiting through waterways in small vessels and blend in with normal 
maritime traffic.59 Senator Johnson points out that as opposed to the southwest land border, 
“the U.S. has very little domain awareness across our maritime border.”60 The U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG), one of the agencies tasked with maritime border security, only has the 
ability to respond to about 30 percent of threats they are made aware.61  
Senator Thomas R. Carper identified the relationship between land and maritime 
border security. He said, “as we have tightened up security on our southern land border, 
for example, traffickers and smugglers are seeking out other paths in the Caribbean or the 
Pacific coast. As we continue to ‘squeeze the balloon’ along our land borders, it’s important 
that there is close coordination among agencies.”62 USCG Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, 
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Assistant Commandant for Response Policy, testified to the United States Senate 
Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs on the USCG commitment 
to layered border security and reported that “between October 1, 2014, and June 30, 2015, 
the Coast Guard interdicted 2,259 illegal migrants attempting to enter the United States.”63 
Also, cocaine seizures at sea annually are three times higher than at the land border.64 
Although seizures at sea are resulting in tons of pounds of drugs due to successful 
intelligence, the vast maritime domain overwhelms the USCG. Rear Admiral Brown stated 
that “90 percent of the Coast Guard’s interdictions in 2014 were cued by intelligence. 
However, current surface and aviation fleet capacity only allow the Coast Guard to respond 
to approximately one-third of actionable intelligence.”65 
In 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the DHS, including the USCG, 
issued the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The National Strategy’s perspective on 
maritime security states that “although the global economy continues to increase the value 
of the oceans’ role as highways for commerce and providers of resources, technology and 
the forces of globalization have lessened their role as barriers. Thus, this continuous 
domain serves as a vast, ready, and largely unsecured medium for an array of threats by 
nations, terrorists, and criminals.”66 With the maritime domain open to commercial traffic, 
it is also available to illegal imports and exports. Additionally, large amounts of money 
generated from drug trafficking have funded transnational criminal organizations and even 
terrorist organizations.67 
The DoD and the DHS view illegal seaborne immigration as a key factor for 
regional stability, which will be one of the top influences of maritime security into the 
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future.68 Social unrest, political instability, and economic inequality will continue to drive 
migration to the United States.69 Also, illegal maritime immigration techniques can be 
taken advantage of by terrorists.70 As a result, the National Strategy for Maritime Security 
proclaims “As security in our ports of entry, at land-border crossings, and at airports 
continues to tighten, criminals and terrorists will likely consider our relatively undefended 
coastlines to be less risky alternatives for unlawful entry into the United States.”71 
Government officials seem to agree that maritime border security is crucially important, 
but the United States is not able to maintain a significant enough security presence in the 
maritime domain. Although experts have argued since the 9/11 attacks that the nation’s 
maritime borders are insecure, there continues to be much more attention paid to land 
border security than maritime security.  
E. HYPOTHESIS 
This literature review and background suggest that the border wall will not be 
effective at stopping immigrants or drugs from entering the country, mostly because of 
increasingly sophisticated smuggling techniques used by transnational criminal 
organizations. Although the wall may have some success in certain individual border 
sectors, it will not stop illegal immigration and drug smuggling completely. This thesis 
hypothesizes that the border will instead be effective at diverting flows of people and drugs 
into other areas and will result in a rise of illegal immigration and drug smuggling through 
the water to the East and West of the border wall. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this thesis is directed toward border security on land and at sea. 
Illegal immigration and illegal drug smuggling data was analyzed and was used as 
indicators of effectiveness for the border wall and border security as a whole. Also, the 
                                                 
68 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
69 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
70 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
71 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
14 
thesis examined the relationship between land and sea border security by analyzing illegal 
immigration and drug smuggling data before and after the United States constructed border 
barriers as a part of its border security strategy. Specifically, data was compared from the 
1980s to 2006, the year the United States created the Secure Fence Act and significantly 
shifted its border security policy and constructed just under 750 miles of fencing in four 
years, then from 2009 to the present.The immigration and drug smuggling data from the 
southern land border was primarily found in CBP records. The immigration and drug 
smuggling data from the maritime borders was derived from USCG and CBP records. 
Background and amplifying information were collected from government reports, news 
articles, and journal articles. If the hypothesis is correct, this research should find that 
although illegal immigration and drug smuggling have decreased along the land border, 
they have increased on our maritime borders.  
This thesis considers physical structures, like fences or walls, to be the same. 
Therefore, they will be used interchangeably and will be included in the definition of a 
border barrier or border infrastructure. Lastly, the border wall and more generally, border 
security, is a current topic of debate within the United States. Therefore, information, 
statistics, and facts about border security continue to evolve so research within this thesis 
may not contain updated information after January 2019. 
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II. U.S. BORDER SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the policy, environment, and threats surrounding the United 
States’ land and maritime borders. It explores the United States’ border security policy, 
with a focus on border infrastructure in between ports of entry, starting in the 1980s and 
into the Trump Administration. Also, the characteristics of both border domains, including 
natural and man-made features, are surveyed to better set the stage for analyzing the 
relationship between land and maritime border security. Next, the threats and weaknesses 
of each domain are presented to understand the possible limitations associated with each 
domain. Lastly, this chapter reviews the budget and manning trends over time for land and 
maritime border security, focusing on the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG). Following where the money and personnel go aids in 
understanding what is important or a priority to the DHS and therefore the president. 
B. BORDER SECURITY POLICY 
Border security in the United States is vital to ensure the country’s overall national 
security. In a letter to Congress, President Trump asserted that “a nation that fails to control 
its borders cannot fulfill its most basic obligations to its citizens—physical safety, 
economic security, essential public services, and the uniform protection of our laws.”72 
This exemplifies the importance placed on border security within the government. This 
sentiment is echoed by many American citizens who are concerned about immigration, 
drug smuggling, and border security, but many others believe the concern about border 
security is overblown. The division in opinion about how to address various border issues 
resonates with individual citizens and is reflected in large political debates and efforts to 
present a border security solution. In fact, President Trump based a large part of his 
presidential election campaign effort on the need for a border wall as a solution to the 
country’s illegal immigration and drug smuggling problems. Immediately following 
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President Trump’s announcement to run for president, his promises of building a wall along 
the southern border began, and they continued well past winning the presidential election.73  
President Trump’s border wall policy is not a new idea. Increased border security 
initiatives have been well documented and supported through several presidencies. In 1986, 
President Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). In doing so, 
Reagan gave “amnesty to illegal immigrants, under certain circumstances, who have been 
residing in the United States since 1982.”74 Along with granting amnesty, the IRCA 
initiated penalties for employing undocumented workers and increased the budget and 
manpower for the predecessor of CBP, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).75 
In the early 1990s, the Clinton Administration authorized 14 miles of continuous fencing 
beginning in the Pacific Ocean and Eastward into the San Diego sector.76 Later in 1996, 
President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) into law. This law authorized secondary and tertiary fencing behind the primary 
fence in the San Diego sector to further defend against the high number of illegal 
crossings.77 The IIRIRA also increased the number of border patrol agents by at least 1,000 
agents each year for the following five years.78  
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration 
pushed counterterrorism and national security to the forefront. Part of this effort involved 
linking the problem of illegal immigration to the threat of terrorism; this effort has triggered 
a series of decisions that changed how we address border security. In 2002, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) was established as a cabinet-level department. Twenty-two 
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different agencies were reorganized under the DHS’s control. This reorganization would 
move the CBP, USBP, and the USCG to the DHS. Preventing terrorism is the primary 
mission of the DHS, as delineated by The Homeland Security Act of 2002, and therefore 
this was the first step of linking illegal immigration to terrorism.79 Next, President Bush 
signed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 to amend the IIRIRA. The Secure Fence Act directs 
the DHS to:  
take appropriate actions to achieve operational control over U.S. 
international land and maritime borders, including: (1) systematic border 
surveillance through more effective use of personnel and technology, such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar 
coverage, and cameras; and (2) physical infrastructure enhancements to 
prevent unlawful border entry and facilitate border access by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, such as additional checkpoints, all weather access 
roads, and vehicle barriers.80  
Within this law, operational control of the border is defined as “prevention of all unlawful 
U.S. entries, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, 
narcotics, and other contraband.”81 Again border security and terrorism were linked 
together, and this has shaped the way the United States views border security. Along with 
broad requirements, the Secure Fence Act authorized about 850 miles of fencing in various 
areas along the border considered to be high risk for illegal border crossings.82 Two years 
later, the Secure Fence Act was amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act which 
lowered the fencing requirements. It allowed the Secretary of DHS to decide the type of 
fence and appropriate locations but now called for no less than 700 miles of border 
fencing.83 
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 Most recently President Trump has attempted to keep his campaign promises about 
building a border wall. On January 25, 2017, He issued Executive Order: Border Security 
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, also known as Executive Order 13767. This 
order called for the “immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, 
monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug 
and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism.”84 The executive order also directed CBP to 
hire 5,000 more border patrol agents.85 To date, construction for replacement of portions 
of current fencing has taken place, but new mileage of fencing has not been completed due 
to lack of funding from Congress. In fact, in early 2019, the government was forced to 
partially shut down nonessential operations for 35 days due to budget complications over 
funding for the border wall.86  
C. LAND BORDER 
1. Geography and Characteristics 
The international border between the United States and Mexico is 1,933 miles 
long.87 Most of the border is within the state of Texas, which contains 1,241 miles or about 
64 percent of the entire border. The rest of the border is located within Arizona, New 
Mexico, and California, which contain 372, 179, and 140 miles of the border, 
respectively.88 From East to West, the border begins in the Gulf of Mexico and ends in the 
Pacific Ocean and contains border cities, deserts, mountain ranges, wildlife preservations, 
Native American territory, and rivers. 
                                                 
84 The White House, “Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” 
The White House, accessed April 14, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-
order-border-security-immigration-enforcement-improvements/. 
85 The White House. 
86 Nick Miroff, “Shutdown Worsens Strain on U.S. Immigration System,” Washington Post, accessed 
April 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/shutdown-worsens-strain-on-us-
immigration-system/2019/01/02/97dd0ef6-0ebe-11e9-84fc-d58c33d6c8c7_story.html. 
87 Janice Cheryl Beaver, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, Report No. RS21729 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 2. 
88 Beaver, 2. 
19 
In California, the 140-mile-long border travels near border cities like San Ysidro, 
CA and Tijuana, Mexico. Then it travels through mountainous and desert terrain. As of 
2017, the U.S. Border Patrol reports that 131.5 miles of the California border have border 
fencing. Furthermore, 101 miles of the border fence is pedestrian fencing, and as illustrated 
in Figure 1, 15.5 miles is vehicle fencing.89 In addition, the border wall near San Diego is 
reinforced by 14 miles of secondary pedestrian fencing and 2 miles of tertiary pedestrian 
fencing.90 With large population areas on both sides of the border and nearly the whole 
state protected by pedestrian fencing, the border patrol has a clear pedestrian crossing threat 
and a strategy to overcome it.  
 
Figure 1. California’s Border Fencing91 
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Arizona has a southern border length of 372 miles.92 Similar to California, 
Arizona’s border barriers encompass nearly the entire border, which amounts to 325 
noncontinuous miles of border walls. Pedestrian fencing consists of 124 miles, and vehicle 
fencing extends 183 miles.93 In certain areas, The DHS has constructed 10 miles of 
secondary pedestrian fencing and 8 miles of tertiary pedestrian fencing to support the 
primary fencing in that area.94 Arizona has one major border town, Calexico on the United 
States side and Mexicali on the Mexico side. The border and fencing divide what would be 
one large community. The state’s terrain has extreme desert conditions along with some 
mountainous areas. The Sonoran Desert stretches throughout most of the Arizona-Mexico 
Border and mostly only uses vehicle barriers for border security. The extreme conditions, 
which often reach 117 degrees Fahrenheit, have claimed the lives of many people trying to 
migrate across.95 Figure 2 illustrates the layout of border fencing in Arizona. 
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Figure 2. Arizona’s Border Fencing96 
New Mexico’s international border is about 180 miles long, consisting mostly of 
desert terrain.97 The Chihuahuan desert, the largest desert in North America, lies mostly 
within Mexico but covers almost all of the southern region of New Mexico.98 This region 
exhibits high temperatures along with little precipitation. The border is protected mostly 
by vehicle fences and very little pedestrian fences. In total, as of 2017, 116 miles of border 
barriers have been constructed in New Mexico, which is the least among all the border 
states. More specifically, the DHS has installed 101 miles of vehicle barriers and only 14 
miles pedestrian fencing.99 Figure 3 illustrates the layout of border barriers in New Mexico. 
                                                 
96 Source: Michelle Mark, Skye Gould, and Andy Kiersz, Business Insider. 
97 Beaver, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, 2. 
98 DesertUSA, “Chihuahuan Desert,” accessed April 8, 2019, https://www.desertusa.com/chihuahuan-
desert.html. 




Figure 3. New Mexico’s Border Fencing100 
Texas is the largest state along the border. It also shares the longest state border 
with Mexico, extending for 1,241 miles.101 Although it has the longest border, Texas has 
relatively fewer miles of a border wall. The U.S. Border Patrol reports 132.5 miles of 
fencing have been constructed. Texas has 115 miles of pedestrian fencing, mostly in the El 
Paso area and the Rio Grande Valley region.102 El Paso is a large city near the border and 
a historically common crossing point for pedestrians. Eastward from El Paso, the Texan 
border is the Rio Grande river, which flows in a serpentine or winding fashion. This creates 
difficulties for patrolling and constructing border barriers that follow the actual border. In 
addition, the 1970 treaty between the United States and Mexico limits the construction of 
barriers in the flood plain of the Rio Grande river without permission from an outside 
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commission.103 As a result, Texas is almost entirely unprotected by barriers along the river. 
Exceptions to this are the highly populated areas of El Paso and the Rio Grande Valley and 
the smaller towns of Del Rio, Eagle Pass, and Laredo, which have short sections of 
pedestrian fencing. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the distribution of border barriers of 
East and West Texas, respectively.  
 
Figure 4. Western Texas’ Border Fencing104 
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Figure 5. Eastern Texas’ Border Fencing105 
2. Threats and Vulnerabilities 
The CBP has a good awareness of the threats it faces on a daily basis, but that does 
not make those threats any easier to overcome. The first and maybe the most obvious 
vulnerability of the land border is the volume of people and goods that request entry into 
the United States. In a Congressional Research Service report, Jerome P. Bjelopera and 
Kristin M. Finklea present data that shows “tens of millions of cargo containers and 
hundreds of millions of lawful travelers enter the country each year.”106 At the same time, 
thousands of pounds of illegal drugs are smuggled into the United States, and over 
hundreds of thousands of pedestrians attempt to avoid law enforcement and illegally cross 
the border.107 The large numbers of legal and illegal entries of people and goods put a strain 
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on the CBP, forcing long wait times to enter the country or lower inspection standards, or 
both. 
There are several other vulnerabilities along the land border. First, border barriers 
can only work if they are the correct type of fencing and in the correct location. For 
example, New Mexico has 14 miles of pedestrian fencing and 101 miles of vehicle fencing. 
Yet, CBP’s El Paso sector in New Mexico had over 25,000 pedestrians apprehended at the 
border in 2017. This could be strong evidence that vehicle fencing may not be the best type 
of infrastructure. Second, there are several areas along the border that are simply 
unprotected by a border wall. In some circumstances, there are gaps where there is fencing 
as shown in Figure 6. Third, border fences or walls are vulnerable to a dynamic adversary. 
In other words, fences are a static solution to a dynamic problem. Therefore, the adversary 
can adapt to the border barrier and find a path around it or through it.  
 
Figure 6. Border Fence Gaps in Texas108 
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Besides the basic fact that someone can use bolt cutters and cut a hole in a fence 
and transit through it, people have been known to go over and under the border fence. This 
is summed up in the common saying “show me a 10-foot wall, and I will show you an 11-
foot ladder.” The innovation from transnational criminal organizations (TCO) is much 
more advanced. In a CNN report of the infamous Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman trial, a 
former Sinaloa cartel leader Jesus Zambada Garcia testified that “in the late 1980s to early 
1990s, 95 percent of cocaine was brought into the United States by a tunnel under Arizona’s 
border.”109 He added that tunnels were the safest and easiest until law enforcement began 
to discover and shut down the tunnel systems.110 As a result, the TCOs adapted and started 
to focus on ports of entry as their entry point for drugs into the United States. The statistics 
back up Garcia’s claim too. Over the last three decades, 197 tunnels have been discovered 
by the CBP.111 Presumably, there are many active tunnels that have gone undiscovered. In 
addition to going under the border wall, TCOs have shifted to using ports of entry to 
smuggle drug through. The border wall is vulnerable to this because not only do border 
walls not protect ports of entry, but they may be in fact funneling people and goods to ports 
of entry and not stopping them at all. 
From a border security perspective, actors and goods are two groups that encompass 
most threats to border security.112 Threat actors can include terrorists, transnational 
criminals, and unauthorized migrants. Terrorists generally have a motivation to inflict harm 
once inside the country, while transnational criminals are more profit driven. Conversely, 
unauthorized migrants generally are incentivized by economic or employment 
opportunities.113 Goods are threats on their own but are often connected to threat actors.  
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Goods that are illegal or prohibited in the United States are standard threats. Examples of 
prohibited goods are drugs, firearms, and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 
Goods that are not prohibited but still smuggled into the country can have an economic 
impact. Generally, to avoid taxes, cigarettes, alcohol, and counterfeit items can be 
smuggled across the border.114 
3. Border Security Budget and Personnel 
The budget given to the United States Border Patrol (USBP) has changed 
dramatically over time. In fact, since 1990, when border security started to shift to more 
focused border enforcement strategy, the USBP budget has increased by a factor of 14.115 
As shown in Figure 7, in 1990 their budget was $263 million, and in 2016 they received 
$3.8 billion in funding. Throughout the 1990s, the budget slowly and steadily increased 
year after year. In 2002, USBP received about a 20 percent increase in budget from $1.1 
billion to $1.4 billion.116 This is most likely in response to a peak of over 1.6 million 
apprehensions along the Southwest border in 2000.117 The next significant increase came 
in 2006, the same year The Secure Fence Act of 2006 was released. After a 28 percent 
budget increase in 2006, the USBP’s funding continues to grow over time. 
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Figure 7. U.S. Border Patrol Budget (FY1990–2016)118 
USBP personnel staffing along the Southwest border follows a similar trend as the 
budget. Staffing levels for the USBP rise almost every year from 1992 to 2018, as 
illustrated in Table 1.119 Exceptions to this are from 2015 to 2018, where the USBP 
personnel numbers drop slightly. Similar to the USBP budget and resulting from a Secure 
Fence Act of 2006 initiative, the most substantial period of personnel increases began in 
2006 and ended in 2014. Overall the personnel levels have increased by nearly a factor of 
five from 1992 to 2018. Also, there is a justifiable difference between border patrol 
manning on the Southwest border compared to the Northern and coastal border. The USBP 
reports their 2018 personnel levels in the Southwest border, Northern border, and coastal 
borders to be 16,608, 2,097, and 248, respectively.120 In other words, the Southwest border 
                                                 
118 Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Budget Statistics (FY 
1990-FY 2015),” January 12, 2016. 
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employs about 85 percent of all border patrol agents. With overwhelming apprehension 
rates along the Southwest border, the lopsided employment of personnel makes sense. 
Table 1. Border Patrol Agent Staffing at Southwest Border 
by Fiscal Year121 
Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sectors Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sectors
1992 3,555 2006 11,032
1993 3,444 2007 13,297
1994 3,747 2008 15,442
1995 4,388 2009 17,408
1996 5,333 2010 17,535
1997 6,315 2011 18,506
1998 7,357 2012 18,546
1999 7,706 2013 18,611
2000 8,580 2014 18,156
2001 9,147 2015 17,522
2002 9,239 2016 17,026
2003 9,840 2017 16,605
2004 9,606 2018 16,608
2005 9,891  
 
D. MARITIME BORDER 
1. Geography and Characteristics 
The United States coastline could be considered its maritime border, but the 
maritime domain is more complicated than that. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) conducts surveys to determine the size and length of the United 
States’ coastlines and surrounding waters. They have determined that the length of the 
United States’ coastline is 95,471 miles.122 This measurement does include the Great 
Lakes, Alaska, and Hawaii; although they may have their own immigration and drug 
smuggling issues, they are outside the scope of this thesis. So, narrowing this measurement 
                                                 
121 Source: United States Border Patrol, “Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year.” 
122 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration U.S. Department of Commerce, “How Long Is 
the U.S. Shoreline?,” accessed April 9, 2019, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/shorelength.html. 
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down to southern states that commonly deal with illegal immigration and drug smuggling 
allows for better comparison to the land border. The states of California, Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida together have 3,051 miles of coastline. 
 The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that a 
country’s sovereign territory extends 12 nautical miles (NM) from their baseline, or 
generally speaking their coastline. In addition, a 24 NM contiguous zone (CZ) and 200 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is established which allows for various custom, 
environmental, and economic laws to be enforced. Therefore, the maritime border is often 
referred to as a domain and includes the length of the maritime border and includes square 
miles of ocean as a descriptor of size. From the perspective of the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG), the leading agency for maritime security, this large size means the Coast 
Guard is responsible for patrolling a vast area. In a statement to the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Rear Admiral William 
D. Lee, Deputy for Operations Policy and Capabilities, USCG, reported that the 
challenging maritime domain requires the USCG to patrol “over 95,000 miles of coastline 
while exercising jurisdiction over 4.2 million square miles of ocean.”123 
2. Threats and Vulnerabilities 
The maritime border experiences threats of drug smuggling and illegal immigration 
just as the land border does. In addition to that, the maritime border’s unique characteristics 
add more threats and vulnerabilities. The National Strategy for Maritime Security identifies 
terrorists, other nations, transnational criminals, pirates, environmental destruction, and 
illegal seaborne immigration as threats to maritime security.124 Of note, transnational 
criminals are active in drug smuggling and trafficking of people. To do this, they 
sometimes hide in plain sight and blend in with regular maritime traffic. In testimony to 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Randolph Alles, 
Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Air and Marine within the CBP, said that maritime 
                                                 
123 What Does A Secure Maritime Border Look Like?: Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security 
of the Committee on Homeland Security, H.R., 113th Cong., 1st sess,. November 19, 2013.  
124 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, “The National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, 3–6.” 
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domain awareness is hard to achieve because “small vessels inbound to the United States 
are generally not required to announce their arrivals in advance, nor are they required to 
make their initial landing at a designated port of entry. Additionally, small vessels have no 
requirement to continually broadcast their position via transponder.”125  
TCOs have used various means to travel at sea and avoid detection from law 
enforcement which therefore poses a threat to maritime border security. Drug smugglers 
have been known to use “go-fast” boats to transport drugs. These boats, as the name would 
suggest, are powerful and fast surface vessels that are usually greater than 25 feet and less 
than 45 feet.126 They travel at night in an effort to travel undetected. “Go-fast” boats can 
transport, depending on the size, up to 2 tons of cocaine.127 Another method smugglers use 
is panga boats. According to a GAO report, “panga boats are open-hulled, flat-bottomed 
fishing vessels designed to arrive and depart directly from a beach. These vessels are 
between 20 and 60 feet long and are fitted with one or more outboard motors.” Panga boats 
can come in different sizes and forms and have been used for smuggling drugs and people. 
A GAO report found that in March of 2015, the USCG seized “5,700 pounds of marijuana 
from one panga boat.”128 A popular style of a panga boat is pictured in Figure 8.129 Panga 
boats offer the ability to travel hundreds of miles and avoid major ports where law 
enforcement congregates.130  
                                                 
125 S., Securing the Border. 
126 Adam Elkus, “The Rise of the Narco Navy,” USNI News, June 15, 2012, 
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129 Michael McCullough, “Boats for Whale Watching”, Flickr Creative Commons, last modified March 
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Figure 8. Panga Boats131 
Another smuggling technique is using subsurface vessels or semi-subsurface 
vessels, also known as semisubmersibles. These vessels are tough to detect by radar due to 
their minimal radar cross-section. Semisubmersibles have a unique buoyancy that allows 
them to float mostly under water with only the top portion of the vessel at wave height. 
They can carry multiple crew members and many tons of cocaine while traveling far 
distances completely undetected.132  
3. Border Security Budget and Personnel 
The maritime border is protected by multiple agencies each with its own source of 
funding. The USCG is the lead law enforcement agency in the maritime domain. It 
monitors the seas from the coastline to the United States’ 200 EEZ and in certain 
circumstances out further to the continental shelf, which could be up to 350 miles. The 
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USCG has over 40,000 active duty members, but that number may be misleading.133 They 
operate all over the country in almost every state, so not all units will contribute to maritime 
security near the southern border. Their organization is split up into two groups, Pacific 
and Atlantic. Then, they are further divided into districts which will have one or more states 
as an area of responsibility. For maritime security, they operate many assets. As of April 
2019, the USCG operates 159 cutters134 of various types and sizes and 600 other smaller 
motor vessels.135 In addition to surface assets, there are 146 helicopters and 55 fixed-
winged aircraft under the USCG control.136 
To support this large organization and its assets, the USCG receives its budget from 
the DHS. The USCG’s fiscal year 2018 budget was $10.67 billion.137 As shown in Table 
2, the USCG’s funding has increased by almost one billion over the last five years. 
Although their funding has trended upwards, Coast Guard leaders often argue that the 
service is in need of more money. In a 2017 CBS News interview, Adm. Paul Zukunft, the 
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, believed that some of the Coast Guard fleet is past 
the age it was designed to operate. As a result, maintenance costs needed to compensate 
for an aging fleet would be $1.5 billion.138 He went on to say that “There were over 500 
events that literally eluded us [last year], We knew they were out there. This really came 
down to we didn’t have enough planes[;] we didn’t have enough ships.”139 
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Table 2. United States Coast Guard Budget 




When the CBP was absorbed underneath the DHS umbrella, a change in thinking 
about border security occurred. Border security was viewed through a national security 
lens and because of terrorist attacks fresh in the country’s mind, border security became 
more of a terrorism than a law enforcement issue. This was backed up by continuous 
increases in personnel and funding to the CBP along with policies that ordered physical 
infrastructure. The Southern border, in a way, became militarized. While the border 
security focus is on the southern border, the Coast Guard fleet has aged beyond its intended 
lifespan and struggles to keep up with its homeland security missions.  
Massive infrastructure projects along the Southwest border has produced mixed 
reviews. Chapter III will present border security statistics related to the current border 
fencing and related to the maritime domain. Studying these statistics over time can 
illustrate the effects of the border wall; how it affects the land border and the maritime 
border. Armed with this knowledge, the United States can use it to understand the effects 
of a new and longer border wall.  
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III. BORDER APPREHENSIONS AND DRUG SEIZURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Because there is a big debate on whether or not the United States should adopt a 
border wall that extends the full length of the U.S.-Mexico border, and with billions of 
dollars on the line, it is essential to understand the effectiveness of a potential border wall. 
First, determining the effectiveness will require data from the CBP to be analyzed for land 
border security. According to the CBP, their mission statement is “to safeguard America's 
borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing 
the Nation's global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.”141 
Secondly, data from the USCG will offer insight into maritime border security and 
how it is related to the land border. The USCG manages multiple missions considered to 
be either homeland security-related or not homeland security-related as delineated by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.142 Of interest to this thesis is their homeland security 
missions. The USCG reports that two of the homeland security-related missions are to 
secure and manage our borders and enforce our immigration laws, both through maritime 
law enforcement.143  
To further refine this, it seems as if the two main concerns are people and goods 
coming into the United States illegally. So, in this chapter, the data for the land and 
maritime border will be presented in the form of illegal border crossing apprehensions and 
illegal drug seizures, arguably one of the more dangerous and prevalent illegal good to be 
smuggled into the United States. Using the same border security indicators for both land 
and maritime borders will allow for justifiable comparison. Also, it will be a way to analyze 
how the two borders’ statistics relate to each other or react to changes in the other. 
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Before presenting the border security data, there are some assumptions that will be 
made in this research that must be highlighted. In a RAND Corporation report, Andrew 
Morral, Henry Willis, and Peter Brownell studied different ways to measure illegal border 
crossing between ports of entry. They found that reporting illegal border crossing 
apprehensions as a means to estimate border security effectiveness may be inadequate due 
to the fundamental problem with the process.144 More specifically, as Morral et al. state, 
“fundamental to the question of border control effectiveness is the proportion of illicit 
border crossings that are prevented either through deterrence or apprehension.”145 
Therefore, the ideal measure of border security effectiveness would be to determine what 
percentage of illegal border crossings have been prevented either through apprehension or 
deterrence. But, we only know the total number of apprehensions—we do not know how 
many crossers were deterred, and we do not know how many people crossed undetected. 
If you know that quantity, a percentage of the total flow of people crossing the border 
illegally can be quantified, and therefore outputting a metric of effectiveness for border 
security.  
Unfortunately, in attacker-defender problems, the adversary always has a say in 
how the situation unfolds. In the case of illegal border crossings, the migrant will choose 
to avoid detection if possible. So, when attempting to calculate border apprehensions as a 
percentage of total illegal crossings, the simple math equation of apprehensions 
(numerator) divided by total crossings (denominator) is flawed. There is a “denominator 
problem” when the USBP does an excellent job of recording and retaining apprehension 
statistics, the numerator, but does not know for sure the total illegal crossings, the 
denominator. The total border crossings are almost impossible to calculate because the 
CBP simply can not count the people crossing the border if they were not detected. 
Additionally, the same logic can be applied to drug smuggling across both the land border. 
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Although other ideas of how to measure the total crossings exist, the CBP still uses 
apprehension rates as its primary statistic. Other methods include stratified sampling 
equations, surveys, respondent-driven sampling, and other advanced analytical models. 
These methods’ effectiveness is, however, outside the scope of this research. Since the 
CBP and the USCG’s most readily available statistic for border security is border crossing 
apprehensions and drug seizures, the analysis associated with this thesis will make 
assumptions based on these statistics. Indications of falling or lower apprehensions or 
seizures in a particular area will be understood to mean there is less flow of people or drugs 
attempting to cross the border in that area. Since the manning, technology, and 
infrastructure has only increased over the years, it is unlikely that the ability to control the 
border has been reduced. Therefore, those intending to cross the border have either been 
apprehended, redirected to another area, or have innovated a way around border security 
undetected in the same area. If the statistics indicate a rise in border apprehensions or drug 
seizures, then my analysis will assume more people or drugs are attempting to cross the 
border in that area or a significant increase in border security in that area has increased 
their ability to control the border.  
This chapter assesses the nation’s land border security and maritime border security 
by examining illegal immigration and drug smuggling across each border. For both 
borders, the data is divided into two time periods: before and after the period 2006-2009, 
when the majority of border fencing was constructed. The data is organized in this manner 
simply to see the effects the border barriers have had on illegal immigration and drug 
smuggling.  
Border fence construction has been a result of various policy decisions. In total, 
these policies have resulted in the construction of 705 miles of border fencing along the 
Southwest border. Some of this is secondary or tertiary layered fencing, so linearly there 
are 654 miles of primary fencing, which included 374 miles of pedestrian fencing and 280 
miles of vehicle fencing.146 As shown in Figure 9, spikes in border wall construction 
                                                 
146 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Mileage of Pedestrian and Vehicle 
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happened in 1992, 1998, and 2006–2009. The overwhelming amount of construction took 
place during the time period of 2006 to 2009, amounting to 592 miles or about 84 percent 
of total border fencing.147 This time period will be considered the “border barrier 
construction period” and will be used to separate the two time periods of data: before 
fencing and after fencing. 
 
Figure 9. Mileage of Border Fencing Constructed per Year (1990–2015)148 
B. LAND BORDER SECURITY 
This section reviews America’s southwest land border security measured in terms 
of illegal immigration and drug smuggling. For each measure, data will be analyzed first 
before the major border barrier construction period beginning in 2006, and then after that 
construction finished in 2009.  
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1. Illegal Immigration before Border Barriers 
Prior to the construction of hundreds of miles of border fencing from 2006 to 2009, 
the USBP apprehended millions of people attempting to cross the southern border illegally. 
Apprehensions between ports of entry have steadily increased from 690,554 in 1980 to 
1,171,396 in 2005, as displayed in Table 3.149 Of note, within these 25 years of border 
security, apprehensions peaked in 2000 with 1,643,679 apprehensions. This is this highest 
number of apprehensions on record from 1960 until today.150  
Table 3. Southwest Border Apprehensions (1980–2005)151 
Fiscal Year  Border Apprehensions Fiscal Year  Border Apprehensions 
1980 690,554 1993 1,212,886 
1981 749,808 1994 979,101 
1982 745,820 1995 1,272,390 
1983 1,033,974 1996 1,507,020 
1984 1,058,276 1997 1,368,707 
1985 1,183,351 1998 1,516,680 
1986 1,615,844 1999 1,537,000 
1987 1,122,067 2000 1,643,679 
1988 942,561 2001 1,235,718 
1989 852,506 2002 929,809 
1990 1,049,321 2003 905,065 
1991 1,077,876 2004 1,139,282 
1992 1,145,574 2005 1,171,396 
 
Note: The full list of yearly apprehensions in each sector is located in the Appendix. 
The number of apprehensions can be further refined by sector. The USBP uses 
geographic sectors to divide the border for organizational purposes.152 These sectors do not 
always follow state lines and can be attributed to cities for their naming. Figure 10 
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illustrates the arrangement of CBP’s border sectors. Apprehension statistics are recorded 
within each sector and can give a more detailed view of where migrants are attempting to 
cross. For example, in 1986, the San Diego sector recorded 629,656 apprehensions while 
the EL Centro sector, the next sector to the East of San Diego sector, only recorded 95,186 
apprehensions. In fact, the San Diego sector documented the highest number of 
apprehensions from 1980 to 1997. During this time, the San Diego sector had substantially 
higher apprehensions than all other sectors. As a result, activity in that sector, at times, 
doubled, tripled, and quadrupled other sectors. This is a clear reason why San Diego was 
the first sector to construct a border barrier.  
 
Figure 10. CBP’s Southwest Border Sectors153 
President Clinton’s administration, in 1993, initiated Operation Gatekeeper which 
focused on increasing the difficulty to cross the border in California, specifically the San 
Diego sector. This spurred about 24 miles of border fencing to be built throughout the 
1990s.154 Operation Gatekeeper was viewed as a success because apprehensions in the San 
Diego sector dropped from 540,347 in 1991 to 151,681 in 2000. In other words, the San 
Diego sector recorded 50 percent of the total apprehension along the border in 1991, and 
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in 2000, it recorded only 9 percent of the total apprehensions.155 As the San Diego sector’s 
apprehension numbers dropped, border sectors to the East began to see a rise in their 
apprehensions. In the El Centro sector, the number of apprehensions more than tripled from 
1996 to 2000.156 Moreover, as the San Diego sector’s apprehensions fell in the late 1990s, 
people were clearly choosing to transit Eastward into the desert to attempt entry into the 
United States. Beginning in 1998, the Tucson sector’s apprehensions surpassed the San 
Diego sector as the leading sector for apprehensions, ultimately reaching 616,346 
apprehensions in 2000.157 The Tucson sector, at this time, had minimal border fencing 
covering its 262 miles of the border.158 Although this area is dangerous due to its desert 
qualities, it became a path of least resistance in regard to border security. 
2. Illegal Immigration after Border Barriers 
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 initiated a construction boom that resulted in 592 
miles of border fencing from 2006 to 2009. These new barriers were mostly located in the 
El Paso, Tucson, and Yuma border sectors and were built in response to the eastward shift 
of illegal migration. Across the whole border, apprehensions totals after 2006 began to 
decline. As shown in Table 4, apprehensions in 2006 were 1,071,972 and thereafter 
continued to mostly reduce throughout the next decade Although apprehension decline 
overall, these facts suggest that the border fencing directly impacts where the flow of 
people are choosing to cross the border. Consequently, at the sector level, this could mean 
the border wall is effective. It also indicates the pitfalls of constructing a fence line with 
many gaps and extensive areas with no barriers at all. This data demonstrates a trend that 
when border barriers are utilized in one area, the flow of people is not stopped altogether. 
Rather, people are just redirected to an area that offers the least amount of resistance. This 
trend is similar to what was seen in the San Diego, El Centro, and Tucson sectors in the 
                                                 
155 United States Border Patrol, “Southwest Border Sectors Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal 
Year.” 
156 United States Border Patrol. 
157 United States Border Patrol. 
158 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Tucson Sector Arizona,” accessed April 26, 2019, 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/tucson-sector-arizona. 
42 
late 1990s.159 From 2006 to 2018, border apprehensions dropped about 63 percent. In 2011, 
apprehensions reached a low of 327,577, a level not seen since the 1970s.160  
Table 4. Southwest Border Apprehensions (2006–2018)161 
Fiscal Year Border Apprehensions Fiscal Year Border Apprehensions 
2006 1,071,972 2013 414,397 
2007 858,638 2014 479,371 
2008 705,005 2015 331,333 
2009 540,865 2016 408,870 
2010 447,731 2017 303,916 
2011 327,577 2018 396,579 
2012 356,873   
 
At the sector level, border apprehensions shifted again following the new border 
barriers. As the migrants attempting to cross the border adapted to the new border barriers, 
apprehensions in the Tucson sector dropped while apprehensions in the Rio Grande Valley 
sector began to rise. In 2013, the Rio Grande Valley sector became the leading sector for 
apprehensions, and that remains through 2018.162 In 2014, The Rio Grande Valley 
apprehended 53 percent of all border apprehensions. Although apprehension decline 
overall, these facts suggest that the border fencing directly impacts where the flow of 
people are choosing to cross the border. Consequently, at the sector level, this could mean 
the border wall is effective. It also indicates the pitfalls of constructing a fence line with 
many gaps and extensive areas with no barriers at all. This data demonstrates a trend that 
when border barriers are utilized in one area, the flow of people is not stopped altogether. 
Rather, people are just redirected to an area that offers the least amount of resistance. This 
trend is similar to what was seen in the San Diego, El Centro, and Tucson sectors in the 
late 1990s. 
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3. Drug Smuggling before Border Barriers 
Drug smuggling statistics are less available, and in certain aspects, offer limited 
details as compared to apprehension statistics. In 2005, the National Drug Intelligence 
Center (NDIC) reported that drugs seizures amounted to 2,337,133 lbs., as indicated in 
Table 5.163 Cocaine is a popular drug of choice in the United States and is often used as an 
indicator of overall drug trends. From 1991 to 2000, cocaine seizures at the Southwest 
border increased.164 Figure 11 demonstrates an upward trend of cocaine seizures with the 
exception of 1998. 
Table 5. Pounds of Illegal Drug Seizures 
at the Southwest Border165  
 
Note: Weights are rounded to the nearest pound 
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Figure 11. Weight (tons) of Cocaine Seizures at the 
Southwest Border (1991–2000)166 
4. Drug Smuggling after Border Barriers 
Illegal drug seizures following the construction of border barriers remained high. 
As Table 6 indicates, marijuana seizures exceed all other drugs by far but do show a decline 
from 2012 to 2018.167 A drop from over two million pounds in 2012 to 461,030 pounds in 
2018 may be a result of the legalization of marijuana in many states. When all drug types 
are combined, drug seizures are also declining. From 2012 to 2018, total drug seizures fall 
about 482 percent, from 2,316,170 lbs. to 479,850 lbs. This is a drastic change in drug 
seizure levels, which raises the question: did the drug seizure level drop because the supply 
was reduced, or were illegal drugs smuggled through a different mode, like ports of entry 
or maritime routes? 
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Table 6. Illegal Drug Seizures in between Ports of Entry (2012–2018)168 
 Drug Type FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 
Cocaine 12,161 4,696 4,554 11,220 5,473 9,346 6,550 
Heroin 430 576 606 518 566 953 568 
Marijuana 2,299,864 2,430,123 1,922,545 1,538,307 1,294,052 861,231 461,030 
Methamphetamine 3,715 3,580 3,930 6,443 8,224 10,328 11,314 
Fentanyl n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 181 388 
Total 2,316,170 2,438,975 1,931,635 1,556,488 1,308,315 882,039 479,850 
Note: Weights are displayed in pounds. 
168 Adapted From: CBP Enforcement Statistics FY2018. 
46 
A more in-depth look at cocaine smuggling routes shows shifts in common 
transportation routes. According to the NDIC, “In 2007, a decline in the amount of cocaine 
seized along the Southwest Border in the South Texas region—the predominant cocaine 
smuggling route at the time—resulted in a sharp decline in the amount of cocaine seized 
overall.”169 Interestingly, seizure amounts for California ports of entry began to increase 
as Texas decline occurred. Eventually, California seizures surpassed those of Texas.170 
C. MARITIME BORDER SECURITY 
The maritime border security section is also organized by outcome measure and by 
time period. First, migrant apprehensions at sea will be used as a measure of illegal 
maritime immigration. This data was derived from the USCG’s records. Second, drug 
seizure data from the USCG’s records will be used as a measure of drug smuggling through 
maritime methods. Both of these measures will be separated by the “border barrier 
construction period,” and therefore will be labeled as before or after border infrastructure 
was built. 
The maritime domain creates a different dynamic for border security. First, it is 
important to know that the USCG conducts operations under two different categories. All 
of the USCG missions can be considered homeland security related or non-homeland 
security related. This is important to know because when analyzing the USCG’s drug 
seizure rates, only a portion of the USCG assets are available or used for homeland security 
related missions. The USCG reports in 2005, “57 percent of resource hours [were] used for 
homeland security missions.”171 This is fairly evenly split compared to 2000, where only 
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38 percent of missions were homeland security related.172 More recently in 2013, the Coast 
Guard missions were split evenly at 50 percent.173 
1. Illegal Immigration before Border Barriers 
Migrants attempting to reach the United States through maritime means has been 
on the decline. The USCG reported 9,900 apprehensions in the fiscal year 2009.174 That is 
less than half of the levels seen in 2005, which were 21,200 apprehensions. Fiscal years 
2006, 2007, 2008 continued the trend of decline with apprehensions of 17,400, 14,600, 
10,900, respectively.175 In 2009, the USCG estimated its apprehension rate at about 84 
percent. That is an improvement from the previous two year’s apprehension rates of 65 and 
62 percent.176 
2. Illegal Immigration after Border Barriers 
Illegal immigration through maritime means is less prevalent than through the land 
border. Although the apprehension levels represent only a small fraction of CBP’s 
apprehensions on land, there is a trend that is important to acknowledge. From 2012 to 
2016, Table 7 shows that maritime apprehensions increased almost every year.177 Also of 
importance, the USCG’s apprehension rate is relatively stable in the 68 percent to 83 
percent range. 
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Table 7. USCG Migrant Apprehensions (2012–2017)178 
 
 
Most of the apprehensions conducted by the USCG are located around the Florida 
area. It is more likely that migrants in this area are from countries in the region like Cuba, 
Haiti, and other islands in the Caribbean. On the other hand, migrants found on the West 
coast are more likely from Central and South America.179 This is an important distinction 
to make because it may be unlikely that a migrant from Cuba travels to Mexico or the West 
coast to attempt to cross the border. Therefore, changes in the West coast apprehensions 
would likely be more linked to land border security. With that in mind, trends can be found 
in West coast apprehensions. The Washington Post reports that “the U.S. Coast Guard saw 
a nearly fivefold increase in the number of migrants it intercepted off the coast of Southern 
California in 2018,”180 Fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018 recorded apprehension numbers 
of 142, 213, and 1,022, respectively.181 This is a small sample size, but with total maritime 
apprehensions declining to 1,668, yet increasing on the West coast, there could be a change 
in maritime migration beginning.182 
3. Drug Smuggling before Border Barriers 
As indicated by the DHS Inspector General’s annual review of the USCG’s drug 
interdiction performance, the goal of this program is to use maritime law enforcement 
                                                 
178 Adapted From: United States Coast Guard, Annual Performance Report Fiscal Year 2017. 
179 Dan Lamothe, “Coast Guard, Working without Pay in a Government Shutdown, Sees a Surge in 






 Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Apprehended 4,086 5,262 7,747 6,028 8,165 3,952
Total Attempts 5,600 7,631 10,629 8,057 10,319 4,760
Apprehension Rate 73.0% 68.9% 72.8% 74.8% 79.3% 83.0%
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assets to seize illegal drugs and therefore reduce the amount entering the United States.183 
In addition, the Inspector General uses specific criteria to evaluate their performance. The 
annual review states “The Coast Guard’s drug interdiction performance is best summarized 
by the lead outcome measure of the program.”184 That lead outcome measure is their 
cocaine, the most common illegal drug seized as sea, and their cocaine removal rate. 
Therefore, most available sources only report cocaine seizures or percent removed as their 
indicator for success.185 Analysis of this sort of data began in 2004 after the USCG was 
moved into the DHS. 
In 2004, the USCG removed an estimated 30.7 percent of the maritime flow of 
cocaine coming to the United States. To the advantage of the USCG, drug interdictions do 
not only take place near the United States’ shores. The mobility that a ship offers is used 
to interdict drug smuggling as close to the source as possible. The source of cocaine is well 
known too. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia cultivate nearly all of the cocaine in the world.186 
Since the source is known, the USCG has identified what they call the “transit zone,” which 
is the path needed to reach the United States through the seas. The Transit zone includes 
“the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean.”187 Knowing the 
source of the drug and the transportation path to the United States, the USCG is able to 
solve the denominator problem that the CBP experiences. The USCG uses intelligence-
based data from the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement which is prepared for 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy by the Defense Intelligence Agency.188 With 
the total cocaine flow estimated, the USCG can evaluate its effectiveness. In 2005, the 
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USCG calculated a 27.3 percent removal rate for cocaine. In other words, more than two-
thirds of cocaine headed for the United States enters without law enforcement interference. 
In the early 1990s, marijuana smuggling through maritime means was more 
prevalent. According to the Department of Transportation, the USCG’s former cabinet-
level department, marijuana seizures in 1992 accounted for over twice as many seizures 
than cocaine, as illustrated in Figure 12.189 In the late 1990s, cocaine seizure levels 
increased dramatically to more than double the levels recorded earlier in the decade. 
Notably, 1997 marijuana and cocaine seizures increased from about 30,000 lbs. each to 
over 100,000 lbs. each. 
 
Figure 12. USCG Cocaine and Marijuana Seizures (1991–2000)190 
                                                 
189 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “U.S. Coast Guard Drug Seizures: Fiscal Years 1991–2000,” 
accessed April 29, 2019, 
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/transportation_statistics_annual_report/2001/chapter_05_figure_
02_128. 
190 Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
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4. Drug Smuggling after Border Barriers 
After the border barrier construction period, the maritime domain experienced a 
significant increase in the flow of cocaine. Not only that, their drug seizures followed the 
same pattern. As displayed in Table 8, from 2010 to 2017, the estimated amount of cocaine 
being transported to the United States increased by 401 percent.191 Unfortunately, the 
amount of cocaine seized did not reach those levels. The USCG recorded an increase in 
cocaine removed of 243 percent.192 It appears the USCG is receiving diminishing returns 
with the assets available. The USCG has set its drug interdiction goal relatively low at 
below 19 percent for over a decade. In 2017, the target cocaine removal rate was 11.5 
percent, and the actual removal rate was 8.2 percent. In the period 2010 to 2017, the USCG 
only met its goal one of the years.193 
Table 8. USCG Cocaine Interdiction by Weight (Tons)194 
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 Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Estimated 
Flow 682 652 796 577 945 1254 2834 2738
Tons 








13.5% 11.6% 13.4% 15.3% 9.6% 11.5% 7.1% 8.2%
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D. CONCLUSION 
Examining the land and maritime border security statistics has established a 
baseline of border security knowledge. In terms of illegal immigration and drug smuggling, 
they both paint a different picture of land and maritime domains. Overall, the land domain 
has experienced an abundance of pedestrian border crossings and drug trafficking, far more 
than the maritime domain. But increased land border security may have forced these 
statistics to decline. What stands out is the trends and patterns that can be found even if the 
overall amount of illegal immigration and drug smuggling is declining. 
Chapter IV will take the information from this chapter and identify significant 
trends and correlations for each domain. These trends will support the argument that there 
is a relationship between the land border infrastructure and maritime border security. As 
security increases on the land border, this analysis will be important in predicting changes 
and outcomes within the less secure maritime domain.  
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IV. BORDER SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Presented with decades worth of data about border security results can seem 
overwhelming. It can also lead readers to believe that illegal immigration and drug 
smuggling enterprises are overcoming the United States’ border security efforts. While this 
may be partially true, the data available offers interesting trends about where people or 
drugs are entering the country and how this changes based on how the DHS secures the 
country’s borders. 
B. BALLOON EFFECT 
Based on the data in Chapter III, a concept known within law enforcement and 
security stands out as particularly significant for border security in the United States. This 
concept is called the balloon effect. The balloon effect is basically a metaphor for how 
enforcement or security efforts displace the thing it was enforcing. Simply put, when a 
balloon filled with air is squeezed on one side, the balloon does not necessarily pop. 
Instead, it forces the air to bulge out to the other side.195 This metaphor can be applied to 
border security quite well. The action of squeezing the balloon represents more or stricter 
security in a given area. In respect to this research, it would represent border infrastructure 
along the border with the personnel and technological support. The air inside the balloon 
represents the thing being enforced or the undesired action.  
Evidence from Chapter III supports this border security balloon effect. In the 1990s, 
the southern border experiences an eastward shift in the flow of people trying to cross the 
border illegally following the border walls constructed in the San Diego sector. In 
California, the San Diego sector’s percent of total apprehensions changed from 50 percent 
to 9 percent within 9 years. Simultaneously, the Tucson sector in Arizona saw dramatic 
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increases in apprehensions and surpassed the San Diego sector by the end of the 1990s.196 
After 2009 and the completion of extensive amounts of border barriers, the balloon effect 
is evident again. Most of the fencing was built on the Western and central sectors, leaving 
Texas vulnerable. As a result, apprehensions surge in Texas and in 2013 the border patrol 
in the Rio Grande Valley sector is responsible for over half of all apprehensions.197 This is 
direct evidence that supports the balloon effect. 
The same concept is supported by illegal drug smuggling efforts. Before most of 
the border infrastructure was built, the border patrol was seizing over two million pounds 
of illegal drugs in between ports of entry. In addition, drug seizures, since the 1990s, 
generally showed an upward trend. Then, border barriers entered the equation, and as a 
result, from 2012 to 2018, drug seizure levels dropped by almost 500 percent.198 So, there 
was definitely a shift in smuggling routes. The difference here, as compared to pedestrian 
apprehensions, is drugs can be concealed in many more ways than people can. Therefore, 
because of the balloon effect, illegal drugs shifted to ports of entry, underground tunnels, 
and maritime routes. Recently, drug seizures at ports of entry have estimated to represent 
about 90 percent of all land drug seizures.199 
An important aspect of the balloon effect to comprehend is not so much how it 
works, but why is it happening? Kenneth Madsen’s explains this well. The issue with 
stopping illegal immigrants and drugs is how the problem is viewed. He explains that, 
The problem is seen as the source, not the demand, and this logically leads 
to the conclusion that the tap needs to be shut off. The only place to stop 
undocumented labour and drugs from entering the United States without 
operating outside the country's borders is at the border itself…. When the 
balloon is constrained or pushed back in one place, it develops enough 
pressure to bulge out somewhere else with increased intensity. Without 
taking the air out of the balloon by addressing the fundamental capitalist 
fuel of supply and demand for illegal cross-border traffic (whether people, 
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drugs, or hatred), border law enforcement simply shifts such activity to 
other locations where it then has a disproportionate impact.200  
So, this suggests that the reason border security seems like an endless cycle is that the 
border security policies, infrastructure, and technology do not address the overarching 
reason for crossing the border. With that in mind, the border wall can still be used as a tool 
to secure the border. In fact, the balloon effect caused by increased border security can be 
used as part of the plan. In other words, barriers in specific areas can potentially redirect 
pedestrians and drugs where the CBP has more of an advantage. For example, a shift in 
drug trafficking to ports of entry is already taking place, and maybe this is better. USA 
Today highlighted the fact that at ports of entry, “agents have the advantage of lights, drug-
sniffing canine patrols, X-ray machines and other high-tech equipment.”201 By taking 
advantage of a predicted shift in the flow of drugs, they can execute their mission closer to 
resources and support, as opposed to border patrol agents traveling far into rural areas.202  
C. THE U.S. BORDER WALL’S EFFECTIVENESS 
The pedestrian apprehension and drug seizure statistics over the years supports the 
balloon effect idea; Increased security in one location causes a shift of illegal activity to 
another location if the underlying cause or demand is not addressed. So, if this is true at 
the southwest border, can the border wall be considered effective? Well, in order to truly 
determine the effectiveness of the border wall, a well-defined goal or purpose of the wall 
needs to be identified. It is also necessary to view the border wall as a tactic within border 
security and not a strategy.203 It is a tool that can be used to give the CBP an advantage in 
controlling the flow of people and drugs across the border.  
The border wall will not be able to stop migrants or drugs from crossing the border 
entirely. This is supported by the various shifts of people and drugs and methods to cross 
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the border. Whether it is through ports of entry, overstaying visas, tunnels, or by sea, the 
border wall can be overcome. This may lead some to identify the border wall as ineffective. 
Alternatively, this research has found that the border wall is effective. It can be considered 
effective because it excels at its primary tasks. The border barriers physically stop people 
or drugs from crossing the border, specifically where the barriers are located. The 
significant part of this is that they only stop the flow at the location of the fence. The border 
fences are not meant to stop tunnels from being built and used; they are not meant to stop 
drugs from being smuggled in ports of entry; border barriers are certainly not meant to stop 
people from overstaying past their visa limits.  
With that in mind, the scope of the border wall’s purpose can be refined. The 
purpose of the border wall now can be considered to be to reduce the adversary’s ability to 
cross the border in between ports of entry with the support of technology by giving border 
security personnel the advantage of time and space along the border. With this goal, the 
current border fencing is effective. The moment border fencing caused the flow of people 
or drugs to shift to another area, that border security tactic is effective. Most importantly, 
this is supported by data described in Chapter III. 
D. THE BORDER WALL’S MARITIME RELATIONSHIP 
If President Trump’s border security initiative of adding more miles of border walls 
eventually becomes a reality, then an assumption can be made based on conclusions in this 
thesis. One can assume that as border security is increased on the southwest border from 
more miles of border walls, then the adversary will continue to shift their tactics. More 
specifically, the maritime domain will continue to become a more viable option as the 
“balloon” is squeezed on the land border. Also, there is evidence to suggest that this has 
already begun to happen. 
On land, drug seizures begin to decline after border infrastructure was 
implemented. More specifically in 2012, cocaine seizure totaled just over 12,000 pounds, 
and in 2018, they totaled only about 6,500 pounds.204 During the same time period, 
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maritime cocaine seizures were on the rise. In 2010, the USCG seized 91 tons of cocaine 
and then seized 223 tons in 2017.205 This suggests that there is a correlation between a 
decline in drug movement on land and an increase through the sea. Unfortunately, the most 
alarming aspect of this is the USCG’s inability to enforce the law at an effective rate in 
such a vast area. While the USCG’s cocaine seizures increased in the last decade, the total 
flow of cocaine based on intelligence estimations increased significantly more than the 
amount they seized. In 2017, it was believed that the total flow of cocaine to the United 
States through maritime routes was 2,738.206 That means the USCG only seized 8.2 percent 
of the cocaine being smuggled by sea. In addition, the USCG has reduced its target seizure 
rate over the last decade, thereby acknowledging their inability to keep up with the increase 
of drug traffic. This is a weakness of the United States’ border security and the adversary, 
based on illegal drug movements, has already identified this. 
A similar trend exists in illegal maritime immigration. While focusing on the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean apprehensions, the most likely area affected by a change in land 
border security, a new and small change has taken place. With the understanding that 
migrant apprehensions in the Eastern Pacific Ocean are still comparatively extremely low, 
a trend has presented itself. From 2016 to 2018, migrant apprehensions on the west coast 
have increased from 142 to 1,022, or about 86 percent.207 Since the numbers of 
apprehensions are still drastically lower than on land, it is hard to view this as a significant 
issue. Even so, the low numbers can be indicative of the beginning of a shift in the 
movement of people and given the USCG’s struggling ability to stop drugs through the 
sea; this may be an area of opportunity for people trying to enter the United States illegally 
in the future.  
Overall, it appears that the maritime domain has a connection to the land domain. 
Changes in security measures on the land have demonstrated a correlation to changes in 
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the maritime domain. Now, with prior knowledge of this relationship, it can be used to the 
advantage of the United States.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Although this thesis is researching just the outcomes of border security, specific 
trends or correlations can be found. Through the CBP and USCG’s migrant apprehension 
and drug seizure data, the shift of movement of people or drugs, as described as the balloon 
effect, can be proven to have a strong correlation with increased border security, namely 
the border wall. With this knowledge, predictions can be made about where the next shift 
will be if the border receives more miles of infrastructure. Judging based on the USCG’s 
struggling efforts to secure the maritime border from current drug flows and a growing 
occurrence of illegal immigration on the west coast, I conclude that the maritime domain 
is not only the greatest border control weakness of the United States, but will increasingly 
continue to be targeted as the path of least resistance to illegally enter the United States, 
for drugs or people, because of the security measures in place on the southwest border. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States is at a border security policy crossroads. Should the border be 
further secured with more walls? Or, should we accept the current level of border 
infrastructure and focus monetary efforts in other areas of border security? After studying 
the effects of the border barriers the United States currently has, it appears that border walls 
can be an effective tool for border security agents. Border infrastructure should be 
considered in specific areas where it is determined that border barriers would be useful. 
This should be done with the forethought that when security is changed in an area on land, 
there will be consequential effects in other less secure border areas on land and at the more 
vulnerable maritime domain.  
Throughout the research for this thesis, certain areas out of the scope of this project 
stood out as areas in need of further research. First, the USCG is dealing with an aging fleet 
of ships, budgetary constraints, and half of its maritime assets conducting non-homeland 
security missions. These factors, along with others, contribute to a low level of success of 
maritime drug and immigration interdictions. Further research is needed to explore these 
factors and make recommendations to improve this valuable military and law enforcement 
service. Second, in this thesis, the effectiveness of border fences was studied using 
pedestrian apprehensions and drug seizures as a measure of success. Further research is 
needed to understand how increased personnel and technology has aided the border barriers 
and if further investment in these areas is necessary.  
Lastly, ports of entry appear to be a common smuggling path for illegal drugs. 
These checkpoints entail a concentrated amount of personnel and technology but are still 
being overwhelmed by the amount of traffic crossing the border, leading to high quantities 
of drugs entering the United States unnoticed. More research is needed to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of security at ports of entry and to make recommendations to 
increase illegal drug detection. 
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APPENDIX.  PEDESTRIAN APPREHENSIONS 




Bend Del Rio 
El 





Diego Tucson Yuma 
Southwest 
Border Total 
2018 8,045 15,833 29,230 31,561 32,641 162,262 38,591 52,172 26,244 396,579 
2017 6,002 13,476 18,633 25,193 25,460 137,562 26,086 38,657 12,847 303,916 
2016 6,366 23,078 19,448 25,634 36,562 186,830 31,891 64,891 14,170 408,870 
2015 5,031 19,013 12,820 14,495 35,888 147,257 26,290 63,397 7,142 331,333 
2014 4,096 24,255 14,511 12,339 44,049 256,393 29,911 87,915 5,902 479,371 
2013 3,684 23,510 16,306 11,154 50,749 154,453 27,496 120,939 6,106 414,397 
2012 3,964 21,720 23,916 9,678 44,872 97,762 28,461 120,000 6,500 356,873 
2011 4,036 16,144 30,191 10,345 36,053 59,243 42,447 123,285 5,833 327,577 
2010 5,288 14,694 32,562 12,251 35,287 59,766 68,565 212,202 7,116 447,731 
2009 6,360 17,082 33,521 14,999 40,569 60,989 118,721 241,673 6,951 540,865 
2008 5,391 20,761 40,961 30,312 43,658 75,473 162,390 317,696 8,363 705,005 
2007 5,536 22,920 55,883 75,464 56,714 73,430 152,460 378,239 37,992 858,638 
2006 7,520 42,636 61,465 122,256 74,840 110,528 142,104 392,074 118,549 1,071,972 
2005 10,536 68,506 55,722 122,679 75,346 134,186 126,904 439,079 138,438 1,171,396 
2004 10,530 53,794 74,467 104,399 74,706 92,947 138,608 491,771 98,060 1,139,282 
2003 10,319 50,145 92,099 88,816 70,521 77,749 111,515 347,263 56,638 905,065 
2002 11,392 66,985 108,273 94,154 82,095 89,927 100,681 333,648 42,654 929,809 
2001 12,087 104,875 172,852 112,857 87,068 107,844 110,075 449,675 78,385 1,235,718 
2000 13,689 157,178 238,126 115,696 108,973 133,243 151,681 616,346 108,747 1,643,679 
1999 14,952 156,653 225,279 110,857 114,004 169,151 182,267 470,449 93,388 1,537,000 
1998 14,509 131,058 226,695 125,035 103,433 204,257 248,092 387,406 76,195 1,516,680 
1997 12,692 113,280 146,210 124,376 141,893 243,793 283,889 272,397 30,177 1,368,707 
1996 13,214 121,137 66,873 145,929 131,841 210,553 483,815 305,348 28,310 1,507,020 
1995 11,552 76,490 37,317 110,971 93,305 169,101 524,231 227,529 20,894 1,272,390 
1994 13,494 50,036 27,654 79,688 73,142 124,251 450,152 139,473 21,211 979,101 
1993 15,486 42,289 30,069 285,781 82,348 109,048 531,689 92,639 23,548 1,212,886 
1992 13,819 33,414 29,852 248,642 72,449 85,889 565,581 71,036 24,892 1,145,574 
1991 8,764 38,554 30,450 211,775 72,293 87,319 540,347 59,728 28,646 1,077,876 
1990 7,180 41,373 28,708 223,219 89,052 97,018 473,323 53,061 36,387 1,049,321 
1989 5,560 46,786 27,524 168,105 75,292 79,650 366,757 51,445 31,387 852,506 
1988 6,209 59,403 41,179 182,566 69,912 60,294 431,592 48,683 42,723 942,561 
1987 9,586 64,934 55,291 231,994 74,139 71,038 500,327 47,481 67,277 1,122,067 
1986 23,796 123,952 95,186 312,892 143,685 121,783 629,656 71,675 93,219 1,615,844 
1985 23,667 99,280 71,519 240,350 114,931 82,826 427,772 55,269 67,737 1,183,351 
1984 22,196 87,058 68,563 212,652 87,059 66,860 407,828 46,283 59,777 1,058,276 
1983 20,829 83,733 71,897 205,944 65,279 57,706 429,121 35,870 63,595 1,033,974 
1982 20,268 48,753 55,440 152,882 40,385 32,533 314,979 32,344 48,236 745,820 
1981 17,584 50,455 59,774 146,872 36,910 32,809 326,836 33,085 45,483 749,808 
1980 15,602 50,762 57,009 127,488 39,167 35,012 285,984 33,668 45,862 690,554 
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